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A B S T R A C T
This paper uses a Markov-switching non-linear specification to analyse the effects of cyber at-
tacks on returns in the case of four cryptocurrencies (Bitcoin, Ethernam, Litecoin and Stellar)
over the period 8/8/2015–2/28/2019. The analysis considers both cyber attacks in general and
those targeting cryptocurrencies in particular, and also uses cumulative measures capturing
persistence. On the whole, the results suggest the existence of significant negative effects of cyber
attacks on the probability for cryptocurrencies to stay in the low volatility regime. This is an
interesting finding, that confirms the importance of gaining a deeper understanding of this form
of crime and of the tools used by cybercriminals in order to prevent possibly severe disruptions to
markets.
1. Introduction
A cyber attack is an attack launched from one or more computers against other computers or networks (either to disable them or
to gain access to data and manage them); it compromises information security by affecting its confidentiality, integrity and avail-
ability. It is a form of cyber risk, which has now emerged as a type of systemic risk and has had an impact on the financial sector in
particular (see Kopp et al., 2017). Bouveret (2018) proposes an empirical model based on the standard Value-at-Risk (VaR) fra-
mework for a quantitative assessment of cyber risk and losses and reports evidence for a number of countries.
Benjamin et al. (2019) point out that in the current environment characterised by heavy reliance on information technology
increasingly frequent and sophisticated cyber attacks from criminals operating in underground web communities such as Darknet are
a very serious issue, and have resulted in estimated annual losses of $445 billion for the global markets (see Graham, 2017). In recent
years cryptocurrencies (Bitcoin in particular) have become a favourite target owing to their anonymity. Cyber attacks are in fact
mentioned as one of the operational risk factors by both small and large “miners”, whose responsibility in a cryptocurrency system is
to group unconfirmed transactions into new blocks and add them to the global ledger known as the “blockchain” (see Hileman and
Rauchs, 2017). Benjamin et al. (2019) propose a framework for gaining a better understanding of this form of crime that causes
significant disruptions to markets. Analysing the tools employed by cybercriminals has therefore become very important for pre-
vention purposes (see Van Hardeveld et al., 2017).
Cryptocurrencies have distinctive features such that traditional methods to estimate and manage risk might not be appropriate
and different portfolio techniques might be required (see Platanakis and Urquhart, 2019; for a thorough review of the empirical
literature on cryptocurrencies see Corbet et al., 2019). In particular, they are known to be highly volatile and to exhibit breaks. For
instance, Thies and Molnar (2018) identify several structural breaks in the Bitcoin series using a Bayesian change point (BCP) model,
whilst Chaim and Laurini (2018) specify two models for Bitcoin incorporating discontinuous jumps to volatility and returns, the
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former being found to have permanent effects, the latter contemporaneous only. Interestingly, Gandal et al. (2018) show that sus-
picious trading activity is the likely cause of such jumps, specifically in late 2013. In the presence of breaks standard GARCH models
can produce biased results (Bauwens et al., 2010; 2014)). In such cases (Ardia et al., 2018a) suggest estimating Markov-Switching
GARCH (MS-GARCH) models, whose parameters can change over time according to a discrete latent variable. Caporale and
Zekokh (2019) show that indeed standard GARCH models yield relatively inaccurate Value-at-Risk (VaR) and Expected-Shortfall (ES)
predictions in the case of the four most popular cryptocurrencies (i.e. Bitcoin, Ethereum, Ripple and Litecoin), and that these can be
improved by allowing for asymmetries and regime switching (see also Ardia et al., 2018b, for some evidence on Bitcoin only).
The present paper also adopts a Markov-Switching framework but aims to investigate the additional issue of whether or not cyber
attacks affect the time-varying transition probabilities of switching from one regime to another. The remainder of the paper is
organised as follows: Section 2 discusses the methodology. Section 3 presents the empirical results. Section 4 concludes.
2. Methodology
The time-varying regime-switching model considered in this paper allows for shifts in the mean and the variance, that is for
periods of low and high returns and volatility, and is given by:
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where =yt percentage change in cryptocurrency prices. Autoregressive terms (up to four lags) are also considered. Therefore, the
parameters vector of the mean equation, Eq. (1) is defined by μ(i) =i low high( , ) and σ(i) =i low high( , ) which are real constants, the
autoregressive terms = ,i i1
4 {εt} which are i.i.d. errors with E =( ) 0t and E =( ) 1,t2 and the random variables {st} in = low high{ , }
which indicate the unobserved state of the process at time t. Throughout, the regime indicators {st} are assumed to form a Markov
chain on with transition probability matrix = ×pP [ ] ,low high, 2 2 where = = =p s high s lowPr( | )low high t t, 1 with low high, .
=p p1i low i high, , i( ). Each column sums to unity and all elements are non-negative. It is also assumed that {εt} and {st} are
independent.
To assess the links between cyber attacks and the cryptocurrencies, we generalise the model in Eq. (1) by allowing the transition
probabilities to vary over time. Following Filardo (1994), the transition mechanism governing {st} is given by:
Fig. 1. Cryptocurrency returns and smoothed probabilities Note: The smoothed probability is the probability of being in the high volatility regime.
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where =wt cyber attacks count. For robustness purposes, the following control variables are also included: =zt VIX for global financial
markets uncertainty and =xt change in cryptocurrency volumes.
Note that since p w/t
low
t 1 has the same sign as γ1, γ1> 0 implies that an increase in cyber attacks, w ,t 1 increases the probability of
remaining in the low regime. Similarly, η1> 0 implies that an increase in wt 1 increases the probability of remaining in the high
regime.1 The same holds for the control variables xt 1 and z .t 1 The density of the data has two components, one for each regime,
and the log-likelihood function is constructed as a probability-weighted sum of these two components.
3. Empirical analysis
3.1. Data
Daily data for four cryptocurrencies (Bitcoin, Ethernam, Litecoin and Stellar) and their corresponding volumes over the period 8/
8/2015–2/28/2019 (for a total of 1301 observations) are employed for the analysis. The sample size was chosen on the basis of data
availability. These series are from coinmarketcap.com.
Table 1
Descriptive statistics and Hansen test.
Panel A Descriptive statisticsa
Cryptocurrency returns Cryptocurrency volumes
Bitcoin Ethe. Lite. Stellar Bitcoin Ethe. Lite. Stellar
Mean 0.201 0.299 0.184 0.273 2,680 996 265 44
S. D. 0.039 0.076 0.057 0.082 3,641 1,331 446 94
Skew 0.261 3.383 1.261 2.055 1.991 1.88 5.026 6.073
Kurt 7.791 68.275 15.204 18.874 8.234 8.172 51.799 64.661
Min 0.207 1.302 0.395 0.366 13 0,111 0, 507 0
Max 0.225 0.412 0.511 0.723 23,800 9,210 6,961 1,511
Obs. 1301 1301 1301 1301 1301 1301 1301 1301
Attacks count by target
Crypto attacks Cyber attacks
1 Day 2 weeks 1 Day 2 weeks
Mean 0.079 1.112 3.085 43.011
S. D. 0.282 1.132 2.257 10.736
Skew 3.513 0.914 0.823 0.591
Kurt 14.991 3.381 3.629 3.326
Min 0 0 0 18
Max 2 5 13 82
Obs. 104 4014
Panel B Markov switching state dimension: Hansen testb
Bitcoin Ethe. Lite. Stellar Bitcoin Ethe. Lite. Stellar
Linearity vs two-states Two-states vs three-states
LR 4.367 4.512 5.013 4.757 0.232 0.351 0.296 0.302
M=0 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.546 0.672 0.643 0.622
M=1 0.002 0.005 0.004 0.002 0.701 0.748 0.718 0.734
M=2 0.004 0.007 0.008 0.005 0.788 0.792 0.748 0.768
M=3 0.010 0.011 0.013 0.009 0.821 0.834 0.809 0.813
a Note: Cryptocurrency returns are the percentage change in cryptocurrencies prices. Cryptocurrency volumes are reported in millions of US
Dollars. In the empirical analysis the percentage change in volumes is used. Crypto and cyber attacks refer to the number of attacks targeting
cryptocurrencies only and other cyber attacks, respectively. Descriptive statistics are reported for the total number of attacks per day (1 day) and the
cumulative number of attacks (intensity measure) using a two-weeks rolling window.
b The Hansen’s standardized Likelihood Ratio test p-values are calculated according to the method described in Hansen (1992), using 1,000
random draws from the relevant limiting Gaussian processes and bandwidth parameter M= 0,1,...,3. Test results for the presence of a third state are
also reported.
1 Note that failure to reject the null hypothesis of =H :0 1 1 = 0 suggests a fixed transition probabilities model.
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The data source for cyber attacks is https://www.hackmageddon.com. These include Crime, Espionage, Warfare and Hacktivism
cyber attacks. We consider cyber attacks specifically targeting cryptocurrencies (henceforth crypto attacks), as well as other cyber
attacks (henceforth cyber attacks). The rational for including the latter is that their extensive media coverage could also affect the
perception investors have of cryptocurrencies, since this type of asset relies heavily on cyber security.
Further, we construct an intensity measure based on the cumulative number of crypto attacks, as well as cyber attacks, using a
two-week rolling window, which is expected to capture persistence. The two measures for both crypto and cyber attacks are shown in
Fig. 1. Visual inspection suggests the presence of an upward trend in the number of crypto as well as cyber attacks over the last two
years; this is particularly apparent in the case of the two-week rolling window measures. Finally, VIX data have been obtained from
the Federal Reserve of St. Louis.
The descriptive statistics (Panel A, Table 1) indicate that returns are positive for all cryptocurrencies. Higher returns are asso-
ciated with higher standard deviations, as in the cases of Ethernam and Stellar, their returns being equal to 0.299 and 0.273,
respectively. All series exhibit skewness and kurtosis. The average number of cyber attacks exceeds three per day (3.085), whereas
the corresponding figure for crypto attacks is much lower (0.079). Over the sample as a whole, the total number of cyber and crypto
attacks was equal to 4014 and 104, respectively.
As for volumes, Bitcoin and Ethereum are the largest currencies by market capitalization, with values equal to $8889 and $4535
millions respectively on the last day of our sample (February 28 2019); the corresponding figures for the two smaller cryptocurrencies
on the same day were $1119 and $112 millions. Volumes have been highly volatile, especially in the case of the smaller crypto-
markets.2
3.2. Empirical results
Maximum likelihood (ML) estimates of the model described above are reported in Tables 2 and 3. The null hypothesis of linearity
against the alternative of Markov regime switching cannot be tested directly using the standard likelihood ratio (LR) test. We test for
the presence of more than one regime against linearity using the Hansen’s standardized likelihood ratio test (1992). The value of the
standardized likelihood ratio statistics and related p - values (Panel B, Table 1), under the null hypothesis (see Hansen, 1992 for
details), provide strong evidence in favour of a two - state Markov regime-switching specification. The presence of a third state has
Fig. 2. Cryptocurrency returns, smoothed probabilities, crypto and cyber attacks, and time-varying transition probabilities. Note: Crypto and cyber
attacks refer to the number of attacks targeting cryptocurrencies only and other cyber attacks, respectively. The time-varying transition probabilities
refer to the probability of switching from a low to a high volatility regime according to parameter estimates (Table 2) for one day crypto attacks.
2 Please note that in the empirical analysis we use the percentage change in volumes.
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also been tested and rejected. The optimal lag length according to Schwarz information criterion is one. In order to assess the possible
role of cyber attacks in determining cryptocurrency returns, we analyse the sign (and significance) of the parameters of the time-
varying transition probabilities (which sheds light on whether or not the cyber attack variable affects the probability of staying in the
same, or switching to a different regime), and also consider their evolution over time to establish whether changes in regime are
triggered by cyber attacks.
In the case of the one-day crypto attacks, the estimated coefficients for the transition probability (Table 2) imply that an increase
(decrease) in the number of crypto attacks decreases (increases) the probability of remaining in the lower volatility regime. The effect
is particularly pronounced for Bitcoin, Ethereum and Litecoin with γ1 being equal to 1.735, 1.403 and 1.951, respectively. On the
other hand, crypto attacks do not appear to affect cryptocurrency returns during highly volatile periods, with η1 being positive but
insignificant. Maximum likelihood (ML) estimates for one-day cyber attacks (not reported for reasons of space) lead to similar
conclusions concerning the signs and significance of the coefficients.
As for the two-weeks rolling crypto attacks measure, a similar pattern emerges, with crypto attacks negatively affecting the
probability of staying in the low regime for all four currencies, although the magnitude of the parameter is smaller in absolute value.
These findings suggest the presence of memory, measured by the crypto attacks intensity, which also drives the dynamics of the
transition probability.
Regarding the results based on the two-week rolling window for cyber attacks (see Table 3), again a similar pattern emerges with
γ1 being equal to 0.119, 0.092 and 0.149 and 0.124 for Bitcoin, Etheuram, Litecoin and Stellar respectively. These results
suggest that cyber attacks affect cryptocurrencies but less than crypto attacks. However, a positive and statistically significant effect
of cyber attacks on cryptocurrencies is found during highly volatile periods, with η1 being equal to 0.021,0.074,0.042 and 0.143 for
Bitcoin, Etheuram, Litecoin and Stellar, respectively.
The evolution of the time-varying transition probabilities and the crypto/cyber attack variables is very informative. The former
vary throughout the sample. Changes in the probability of remaining in the less volatile regime appear to be triggered by the crypto/
cyber attacks pattern for all four cryptocurrencies (see Fig. 2). The sharp increase in the number of cyber attacks over the last two
Table 2
Markov switching estimation results – crypto attacks.
One day crypto attacks Two weeks crypto attacks






















































































































































































































LB 0.272 0.451 0.440 2.564 0.272 0.451 0.440 2.564
LB2 2.665 3.551 4.071 4.887 2.665 3.551 4.071 4.887
LogL 2747.7 1922.5 2357.3 1812.5 2754.8 1929 2359.4 1816.1
Note: Autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity-consistent p-values are reported in brackets. LB and LB 2are the Ljung-Box test (1978) of significance of
autocorrelations of ten lags in the standardized and standardized squared residuals respectively.
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years has decreased the probability of remaining in the low volatile regime p( )t
low .
Finally, concerning the two control variables, as one would expect, an increase (decrease) in volume changes decreases (increases)
the probability of staying in the low regime γ3< 0, whereas it increases (decreases) the probability of remaining in the high regime,
η3> 0. The coefficients on the VIX instead are not significant and suggest that crypto currencies are not responsive to global financial
markets uncertainty.
Overall, all models appear to be well identified for all four cyber attack measures used. The results indicate the presence of
statistically significant low (μl) and high (μh) returns for all four cryptocurrencies. The low state returns are negative (μl<0) except
for Bitcoin. Volatility appears to drive the Markov process, with volatilities in the high regimes (σhigh) being at least four times as big
as those in the low regimes (σlow). The periods of high and low volatility seem to be accurately identified by the smoothed prob-
abilities, which satisfactorily separate the two regimes for all four cryptocurrencies (Fig. 1). Visual inspection suggests that high-
volatility episodes mostly occurred in 2017, whilst the following year exhibited lower volatility. Diagnostic tests on the standardized
residuals (Ljung-Box statistics for dependency in the first moment and for heteroskedasticity) do not provide any evidence of linear or
non-linear dependence.
4. Conclusions
This paper uses a Markov-switching non-linear specification to analyse the effects of cyber attacks on returns in the case of four
cryptocurrencies (Bitcoin, Ethernam, Litecoin and Stellar) over the period 8/8/2015–2/28/2019. More specifically, it examines
whether and how they affect the probability of switching between regimes. Previous studies had shown the presence of breaks (see,
e.g., Thies and Molnar, 2018 and Chiem and Laurini, 2018) and the importance of allowing for regime switches when analysing the
behaviour of cryptocurrencies (see Caporale and Zekokh, 2019); it had also been suggested that suspicious trading activity might be
behind jumps in the series (see Gandal et al., 2018); the present study shed lights on the possible determinants of such switches by
focusing specifically on the role of cyber attacks given the key importance of cyber security for assets such as cryptocurrencies. The
analysis considers both cyber attacks in general and those targeting cryptocurrencies in particular, and also uses cumulative measures
Table 3
Markov switching estimation results – cyber attacks.
One day cyber attacks Two weeks cyber attacks






















































































































































































































LB 0.272 0.451 0.440 2.564 0.272 0.451 0.440 2.564
LB2 2.665 3.551 4.071 4.887 2.665 3.551 4.071 4.887
LogL 2747.7 1922.5 2357.3 1812.5 2750.4 1924.4 2360.1 1817.7
Note: See notes Table 3
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capturing persistence. On the whole, the results suggest the existence of significant negative effects of cyber attacks on the probability
of cryptocurrencies staying in the low volatility regime. This is an interesting finding, which confirms the importance of gaining a
deeper understanding of this form of crime (Benjamin et al., 2019) and of the tools used by cybercriminals (Van Hardeveld et al.,
2017) in order to prevent possibly severe disruptions to markets. Further research could explore intra-day data, a wider set of
cryptocurrencies as well as cyber attack indicators grouped by targets.
Supplementary material
Supplementary material associated with this article can be found, in the online version, at 10.1016/j.frl.2019.09.012
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